In politically competitive jurisdictions, there can be strong electoral incentives to increase the generosity of public pensions and simultaneously, to not fund them fully, in order to keep taxes low. I examine the relationship between political competition and generosity of public pensions using a panel dataset for 3,000 municipal plans from Pennsylvania for the period [2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009][2010][2011][2012][2013]. I find that as the level of political competition in a municipality increases, pension plans become more generous but this relationship holds true only for plans run by municipal governments. A one standard deviation increase in the level of political competition is associated with an increase in the generosity of municipal plans by about 3 percent ($426-507/retiree/year) with no effect on plans run by municipal authorities. The effects of political competition are driven by municipalities that have a higher proportion of uninformed voters and are absent for defined contribution plans.
We all know what to do, but we don't know how to get reelected once we have done it.
-Jean-Claude Junker, Prime Minister of Luxembourg (2005) 1 A recent survey of the compensation of state and local government workers (Gittleman and Pierce 2012) presents us with a number of stylized facts. Although wages for state and local government workers are roughly equal to wages of comparable private-sector workers, benefits are significantly more expensive in the public-sector. These differences in benefits lead to overall compensation costs being 10-19 percent higher in local government (and 3-10 percent higher in state government) than in the private-sector. Honing in on the different categories of benefits, we see that state and local governments spend more than triple on retirement and savings compared to what is spent by employers in the private-sector. 2 Those differences are magnified when we examine the amount employers spend on defined benefit (DB) pension plans. 3 It is an open question why compensation for state and local government workers is thus structured -disproportionately in the form of benefits.
This paper offers an explanation that centers on the role of incentives faced by state and local politicians who decide on the terms and conditions of employment for public-sector workers. It proposes that political competition, defined as the lack of a systematic electoral advantage by either political party, can help explain why public-sector compensation tends to be back-loaded. If public-sector workers are better informed than workers in the private-sector, competition for votes creates incentives for politicians of all stripes to promise generous retirement benefits to workers in the public sector and simultaneously, to not fund them fully, in order to avoid raising taxes on workers in the private sector.
Thus, a higher degree of political competition in a municipality (or a state) will be associated with an increase in the generosity of retirement benefits and a decline in the funding status of pension plans run by those jurisdictions. For purposes of tractability, this paper examines the effects of political competition on one of those two dimensions -the generosity of pension plans -with the effects of political competition on the funding of such plans the focus of a complementary paper (Bagchi 2017).
To test the effects of political competition on generosity, I examine municipal pension plans from the state of Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania provides a rich setting to investigate these issues because its local governments offer over 1,400 retirement systems that account for more than 40 percent of all public-employee retirement systems nationally. 4 The existence of such a large number of plans is driven in part by the plethora of local governments and by the fact that unlike other states with a large number of local governments, there has never been a consolidation of local plans at the state 1 http://www.economist.com/node/8808044 2 On average, state and local governments spend $3.18 and $3.37/ hour/employee on retirement and savings while the comparable number for the private-sector is $1.00 (Ref. Table 2 , Gittleman and Pierce 2012). 3 DB plans promise lifetime pension benefits that are typically a specific fraction of an employee's last drawn salary. State and local governments spend $2.65 and $3.09/ hour/ employee on DB plans whereas the private-sector spends only $0.43 (Ref. Table 2 , Gittleman and Pierce 2012). 4 https://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/g11-aspp-sl.pdf (Ref . Table 5a ). Of the 3,418 public-employee retirement systems in the United States, 1,422 (or, 41.6%) are local retirement systems from Pennsylvania. level. Given the political landscape of the state, we also observe wide variation in the level of political competition, our independent variable of interest. Finally, I am able to obtain and use a high-quality administrative panel dataset spanning the period from 2003 through 2013 for my analysis. These data do not suffer from non-response bias and cover the universe of local pension plans. Given the challenges researchers face in obtaining data on municipal pensions, to the best of my knowledge this
is the first paper to analyze the reasons for variation in the generosity of local plans.
The primary empirical approach used in the paper is difference-in-differences (DID) in which DB plans run by municipalities (the treated group) are compared with DB plans run by municipal authorities (the control group). In contrast to the governing body of a municipality that is directly impacted by the outcome of an election and is likely to be responsive to voters, the appointed board of a municipal authority is relatively far removed from the electoral will of voters. The insulation of municipal authorities from political influence along with their ability to establish pension plans that are subject to the same reporting and funding standards as municipalities forms the basis of our empirical specification. Using this DID approach, I find that as the level of political competition in a municipality increases, pension plans become more generous but this relationship holds true only for plans run by municipal governments and not for plans run by municipal authorities. In terms of magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in the level of political competition is associated with an increase in the generosity of municipal plans by about 3 percent (roughly $426-507 per retiree per year) with no effect on plans run by municipal authorities. 5 An added attraction of using data on municipal pensions from Pennsylvania is that about a quarter of the plans are defined contribution (DC). 6 Given that a more generous DC plan requires higher employer contributions in the present -which must be met through tax increases likely to displease voters -we expect the effects of political competition on such plans to be muted compared to the effects of political competition on DB plans. Those predictions are confirmed in the data. I find that political competition has no effect on the employer contribution rate for DC plans, and this holds for DC plans offered by municipalities as well as DC plans offered by municipal authorities.
Finally, I examine an assumption made in the construction of models that associate the underfunding of public pensions with a lack of information and understanding among private-sector voters about public pensions (Glaeser and Ponzetto 2014). I propose that back-loading DB pension plans (and underfunding them) can persist in equilibrium only if private-sector workers are not fully informed of the benefits promised to public-sector workers and do not realize that they will have to bear the 5 A one standard deviation increase in the level of political competition, using the measure defined in Besley, Persson, and Sturm (2010), would result if the Democratic vote share were to go down from 57.5 percent (leaning Democratic) to 50 percent (most competitive), or go up from 42.5 percent (leaning Republican) to 50 percent (most competitive).
6 "Defined contribution plans are retirement plans that specify the level of employer contributions, if any, and place those contributions in individual accounts. The value of an individual account is determined by the amount of money contributed and the rate of return on the money invested over time." (BLS, 2010) burden of any shortfalls in the pension fund through a combination of tax increases and service cuts.
I take this implication seriously and split the sample of municipalities into two groups based on the level of voter awareness and engagement with the prediction that the effects of political competition are smaller in places that have more well-informed voters. Using data on the prevalence of newspaper readership at the local level as a proxy for voter awareness, I find that the effects of political competition are indeed muted (and in fact, absent) in municipalities where a larger fraction of residents subscribe to a newspaper. The results from this sample-split test suggest that when faced with an electorate that is more informed of the true cost of offering back-loaded compensation packages to public-sector workers, politicians are less likely to make these pension plans more generous.
Literature review
This paper builds on a number of different streams of literature. In the body of work that examines public-sector labor markets, much of the focus has been on differences in wages between public-and private-sector workers (see, for example, Ehrenberg and Schwarz 1986 and the studies cited therein).
However, given the growing importance of benefits for all workers, particularly for those in the public sector, examining wages alone is unlikely to provide a complete picture of the differences in compensation between the two sectors. More recently, Gittleman and Pierce (2012) and Bewerunge and Rosen (2013) have used microdata to investigate the how wage and pension benefits compare for workers in the public-and the private-sectors. The papers arrive at roughly similar conclusions even though they look at different periods and use very different data sources. 7 Both report that while wages of state and local workers are roughly equal to that of comparable private-sector workers, benefits are significantly more generous in the public-sector and drive overall compensation costs higher for that sector. 8 Focusing most directly on the question of why compensation structures are back-loaded, explanations have been proposed that back-loading may promote employee retention and foster longer on-thejob tenures, which in turn enhances productivity (Lazear and Moore 1988; Lazear 1990). The empirical evidence in support of that thesis is however mixed. Gustman and Steinmeier (1993) note that jobs covered by pensions also offer higher levels of compensation than what workers can obtain elsewhere, and it is these compensation premiums (rather than the existence of pensions per se) that drive lower turnover. Moreover, turnover rates are lower for jobs offering DC plans as well which tend to not be backloaded. Gustman and Steinmeier (1995) hint that an unmeasured factor associated with employ- 8 Bewerunge and Rosen (2013) include federal workers in their analysis as well and find that wages of federal workers are about 28 log points higher than comparable private-sector workers. These higher wages are not offset by lower retirement benefits and federal employees have substantially more pension wealth than their private-sector counterparts. ment on jobs offering backloaded pensions may account for some of the reduction in turnover observed for workers covered by pensions. The implication for us is that as we compare the generosity of pension benefits across municipalities, we control for a large set of employer and employee attributes.
Moving further afield, the basic argument offered in this paper that the lack of understanding about pensions creates incentives for politicians to offer generous benefits ties to the idea of fiscal illusion. Under fiscal illusion taxpayers' failure to perceive the full extent of tax burdens can prevent them from recognizing the true cost of public services and as a result, distort fiscal policy (Banzhaf and Oates 2013). 9 Political budget cycles by which politicians run expansionary monetary and/or fiscal policies prior to elections can be seen as a manifestation of fiscal illusion. While the first generation of models (e.g., Nordhaus 1975) rested on some form of irrationality or ignorance on the part of voters, subsequent models consider voters as fully rational but imperfectly informed (e.g. Rogoff 1990; Rogoff and Sibert 1988). The takeaway from this body of literature is simply that politicians pander to voters by running hidden deficits and the more responsive voters are to pandering, the higher the hidden deficits. In the context of Pennsylvania, where local government are constrained to run balanced budgets, politicians enact policies that lead to deficits in the pension plans they run.
Finally, tied to the literature on the political economy of budget deficits, a number of papers have examined the influence of politics on the fiscal health of public pensions. Fitzpatrick (2017), for example, exploits a reform enacted by the Illinois state legislature in 2005 that required school districts to bear the full cost of increasing wages for teachers approaching retirement to find support for the view that intergovernmental incentives distort the true costs of offering generous retirement benefits to public-sector workers. Focusing squarely on the politics of pensions, Anzia and Moe (2017) note that prior to the Great Recession voters were unconcerned and uninformed about public pensions creating an environment "conducive to a bipartisan brand of politics in which Republicans went along with Democrats and unions in supporting generous pension plans for public workers, which they drastically underfunded." Most relevant to us in providing a theoretical underpinning for this study is
Glaeser and Ponzetto (2014) who posit that pension obligations are shrouded because of lower availability of information about pensions than wages and because of the greater difficulty taxpayers face in understanding the operation of defined benefit plans, in contrast to current compensation. 10 While a complete discussion of their model is beyond the scope of this paper, their basic message applies to our context as well: given voters' lack of understanding of DB pensions, the political process induces the back-loading of compensation in the form of retirement benefits.
11
9 Fiscal illusion has its origins in the writings of Puviani (1903) but received significant interest following Buchanan (1967), and is reviewed in Oates (1988) . 10 In support of their claim, they note that salaries of state employees are publicly disclosed annually whereas no such database exists for the accruing pensions of retirees or active members. For example, salary data for state employees from the state of Pennsylvania are available at: http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2013/03/search_pennsylvania_state_empl.html.
11 A similar intuition is provided in Epple and Schipper (1981) who conjecture that increased political competition may induce politicians to underfund pension liabilities, so as to be able to reduce taxes in the short-run; this behavior is rewarded by those voters who are unaware of deferred pension obligations.
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Institutional Context
Before turning to the empirical analysis, it is worthwhile having a brief primer on the institutional context. As noted earlier, I examine local pension plans from the state of Pennsylvania because it provides a rich setting; the state offers more than thrice the number of public-sector retirement systems as any other state and accounts for two-fifths of the nation's public-sector plans. The existence of such a large number of plans in Pennsylvania can be attributed to its complex system of local government.
With over 2,500 municipalities -cities, boroughs, and townships -the state has the second highest number of general purpose local governments in the country. 12 Moreover, unlike other states with a large number of municipalities, most local governments in Pennsylvania establish separate pension plans for their police and non-uniformed employees and are not part of a larger state-wide plan. 13 The advantages of using municipal data to test the hypotheses are the large number of comparable cases that share the same national and state-level political context (e.g. state income tax rates) at the same time they exhibit wide variation on the variables of interest, viz. political competition and pension generosity. The availability of rich municipal-level data from the Decennial Censuses and the American Community Surveys (ACS) also enables me to control for many potentially important municipal characteristics that could influence the generosity of pension plans.
Another aspect of Pennsylvania's municipal pensions that makes it attractive to analyze is that municipal authorities, that number over 1,500 (DCED, 2015), can and do offer pension plans subject to the same reporting and funding standards as municipalities. Authorities tend to perform a very limited number of functions such as the provision of water (e.g. Erie City Water Authority) or sanitation services (e.g. Radnor-Haverford-Marple Sewer Authority). Municipalities justify the provision of services through a municipal authority on multiple grounds. Beyond the single-minded focus that the board of an authority can have on its operations and the fact that many services are provided efficiently only if a large service area spanning multiple municipalities is covered, the governance of municipal authorities may also be more conducive to their operation. Authority board members are appointed by the governing body of the municipalities where they provide service for five-year overlapping terms.
Therefore in contrast to the governing body of a municipality that can change en masse following an election, the appointed board of an authority is relatively insulated from the electoral will of voters.
As a result, Bennett and Dilorenzo (1982) note that authorities "can raise and spend money without reference to the immediate wishes of the electorate, whereas a government can raise and spend money only in the amounts and manner specified by the electorate under the constitution and statutes of the state." The insulation of municipal authorities from political influence along with their ability to establish pension plans for their employees forms the basis of our differences-in-differences style spec-12 Source: https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2012/econ/g07-cg-isd.pdf, p. 252. 13 Larger municipalities may also have a separate pension plan for firefighters. Teachers belong to a separate state-wide system, the Pennsylvania Public School Employees Retirement System (PSERS) that is not a part of this analysis.
6 ification in which we compare plans run by municipalities with those run by municipal authorities.
Operationalizing the differences-in-differences approach requires assigning each authority to a single municipality. Doing so is straight-forward for an authority that serves a single municipality where the service area of an authority and a municipal boundary perfectly match (e.g. Erie City Water Authority). In the case of municipal authorities that service more than one municipality, the following rules were used in order to assign a municipal authority to a single municipality. First, I examine the composition of the board of the authority and assign the authority to that municipality which has the largest number of board seats. If that information is unavailable or is inconclusive (e.g. equal number of board members from two or more municipalities), I examine how the authority is financed; I assign the authority to whichever municipality (or municipal residents) pays the largest share of expenses associated with the operation of the authority -information that is obtained from the annual reports of these authorities. If such information is not available either or is yet inconclusive, then I assign the authority to that municipality which has the largest population among all the municipalities served by the authority. Full details of the assignment are available on request from the author.
Empirical analysis
Construction of Variables and Data Sources
Data regarding municipal pension plans offered by the various local governments within Pennsylvania were obtained from the Public Employee Retirement Commission (PERC). As part of its enabling statute, the PERC was required to publish a status report on a biennial basis that lists the level of assets and liabilities and the number of active members for each local government plan.
14 While these reports are available to us from 1985 onwards, 15 they lack the data necessary for analyzing the generosity of pension benefits -for example, the normal costs of the plans or the amount paid out in benefits to retirees. The dataset that includes those variables, although only available from 2003 through 2013, are rich and are what I use for my analysis. They include the name of the municipal entity offering the plan, the type of plan (DB vs. DC), the employee group covered (either policemen or firefighters or non-uniformed personnel), and the status of coverage by Social Security. 16 They also 14 The PERC was created through the Public Employee Retirement Commission Act of 1981 to "review legislation affecting public employee pension and retirement plans and to study on a continuing basis public employee pension and retirement policy as implemented at both the State and local level, the interrelationships of the several systems and their actuarial soundness and cost" (http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/US/PDF/1981/0/0066..PDF). The responsibilities of the commission were transferred to the Department of the Auditor General in 2016 (http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/li/uconsCheck.cfm?yr=2016&sessInd=0&act=100).
15 Bagchi (2017) which analyzes the effects of political competition on the funding level of pension plans uses these data and finds that higher levels of political competition are associated with declines in the funded ratio for municipal plans. 16 About 28 percent of state and local government employees in the U.S. were not covered by Social Security in 2008 (Nuschler, Shelton, and Topoleski 2011). I find that extent of coverage of local employees within Pennsylvania under Social Security is similar to the national average, with about 26 percent of local employees in the sample not covered by Social Security in 2009. 7 include the number of active members and the corresponding payroll, the number of beneficiaries and the amount paid out in benefits, and the amount contributed by employees into the plan. The dataset for DB plans includes the funded ratio and the normal costs for the plan along with the interest rate assumed in estimating actuarial liabilities while the dataset for DC plans includes the contributions made by employers into the plan -both in absolute terms and as a percentage of payroll.
Constructing measures of political competition at the local level is challenging as there is no central repository for data on municipal elections at either the federal or the state level. I construct proxy measures for political competition at the local level by looking at the vote shares for the two parties for all races to any of the six offices for which elections are held on a state-wide basis, namely, U.S. A number of additional data sources are used for our analysis. Data on controls at the municipal 17 Election for the office of Lieutenant Governor is held separately in the primary election; for the general election each party's ticket for Governor and Lt. Governor is made up of the highest vote getters in the separate primary elections. 18 As Besley, Persson, and Sturm (2010) note, name recognition of candidates for down-ballot offices is typically very low among voters, making it likely that measures of political competition based on races for these offices is driven largely by party attachment of voters rather than the popularity of individual politicians. 19 
Empirical Specification
Panel data on plan features for all municipal DB and DC plans are available on a biennial basis The 5-year estimates from the ACS are used because they provide data for all areas, whereas the 1-year (3-year) estimate only covers areas with populations more than 65,000 (20,000). https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/guidance/estimates.html To put that in context, the median-sized municipality in Pennsylvania has fewer than 2,000 residents. 21 Pennsylvania has allowed collective bargaining for policemen and firefighters since 1968 and for other employees since 1970. 
where:
• G imt is the dependent variable, the average annual benefit per retiree for plan i in municipality m (or a municipal authority serving municipality m) in year t;
• P C mt is a measure of political competition in the municipality m for year t, with l the lag length;
• M A i is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if plan i is operated by a municipal authority and zero otherwise;
• C it are a set of dummy variables indicating which group of employees are covered by the plan (e.g. policemen or non-uniformed personnel, etc.);
• X it includes the coverage of employees under Social Security (1 = Yes, 0 = No) and the fraction of employees covered by collective bargaining;
• Z mt are time-variant controls at the municipal level listed below;
• λ c are county fixed effects and γ t are year fixed effects; and
• ε imt is the error term.
In the empirical analysis, I start off with a parsimonious specification that includes only the mea- 23 23 Our interest is in measuring the causal impact of political competition on benefits and so we do not take a stance on Subsequent specifications include time-varying controls at the municipal level that might affect the generosity of pension plans -the per capita income, the fraction of tax revenues spent on debt service, the unemployment rate, the percentage of households that are owner-occupied, the percentage of population aged 65 or older, the level of income inequality, and the level of ethnic fragmentation.
I control for per capita income, the local unemployment rate, and the fraction of tax revenues spent on debt service as proxies for local economic conditions; prosperous municipalities are likely to offer generous pensions whereas municipalities experiencing high levels of fiscal stress may find it harder to do so. The percentage of households that are owner-occupied is included as a control because owners have a longer time horizon than renters and we may therefore expect homeowners to exercise more discipline on politicians who make decisions about public-sector benefits ( ). Thus, in our base specifications I lag political competition by 11 years but in the robustness whether the observed union premiums reflect the causal effects of unions on benefits or whether unobserved differences across municipalities drive those differences. By including coverage under collective bargaining as a control we simply want to reduce the possibility that differences across plans based on unionization are driving the effects of political competition that we observe. 
Examining the Effects of Political Competition on Defined Benefit Plans
In this section, I present estimates of the effects of political competition on the generosity of DB pensions operated by the various municipalities and municipal authorities within Pennsylvania. I start off with results from a parsimonious specification, which is then augmented with the inclusion of variables that are also likely to influence the generosity of pension plans. I next present a host of checks which examine the sensitivity of the results to operationalizing the dependent variable differently and measuring political competition in alternative ways. I conclude this section with a number of robustness checks that address possible concerns of omitted variable bias.
Results from the base specification on pension plan generosity
Before providing the regression results, I first present the data visually. In Figure 1 I simply plot the average benefit levels for municipal plans and plans run by municipal authorities splitting the sample into terciles 26 based on their underlying level of political competition. Given that benefit levels differ substantially between non-uniformed personnel versus policemen and firefighters, I plot benefit levels for these different groups of employees separately, with retiree benefits for non-uniformed personnel in the two panels on the left and those for policemen and firefighters in the two panels on the right.
[ Figure 1 about here.]
An inspection of the figure conveys the key message of this paper: We observe that an increase in political competition is associated with an increase in the generosity of benefits for municipal pension plans for both groups of employees, but there is no consistent pattern in the relationship between political competition and the level of benefits for plans operated by municipal authorities. The rest of 26 Terciles partition the data into three equal-sized groups, each containing a third of the total data.
this section is devoted to showing that these patterns in the data hold up to the inclusion of a variety of controls which might affect plan generosity and are robust to several plausible empirical specifications.
I present the regression results which are obtained by estimating specification (1) with the log average annual pension benefit per retiree as the dependent variable in Table 2 . Columns (1) through (3) of the table present the coefficient on political competition for municipalities while columns (4) through (6) present the coefficient for municipal authorities. 27 Columns (1) and (4) correspond to the most parsimonious specification that only includes our key independent variable of interest, political competition, along with county and year fixed effects and dummy variables for the various employee groups covered by the pension plans. Columns (2) and (5) introduce a dummy variable for the coverage of employees under Social Security and the fraction of employees covered by collective bargaining.
Columns (3) and (6) are the most complete specification and include the class of the municipality and all municipal-level controls that proxy for local economic conditions, homeownership, the age structure of the population, local income inequality and ethnic fragmentation. In the interests of space, only the coefficients on political competition are presented in this (and all subsequent) tables with complete results including coefficients on the control variables available on request.
[ Table 2 about here.]
The coefficients on political competition in columns (1) through (3) suggest that a higher level of political competition is associated with a higher benefit level for retirees in municipal plans. To provide a sense of magnitude of these effects, note that if the level of political competition were to increase by one standard deviation, 28 the benefit received by the typical retiree for a typical pension plan would go up by about $507-750/ year. In contrast, based on examining the coefficients in columns (4) through (6), we do not find any effect of political competition on the generosity of plans run by municipal authorities. The coefficients are precisely estimated to be zero, with standard errors that are an order of magnitude larger than the coefficient estimates.
The coefficients on some of the control variables, while not of primary interest, are worth mentioning. Moving from no coverage under collective bargaining to full coverage of all employees is associated with an increase in pension benefits by 36 percent in our most complete specification. Economic prosperity of the municipality, as captured by the per capita income, is also associated with a more generous pension plan, 29 while a higher prevalence of homeownership has a moderating influence on the generosity of these benefits. 30 Higher ethnic fragmentation is also associated with more generous 27 Coefficient on political competition for municipal authorities = Coefficient on political competition for municipalities + Coefficient on the interaction term, political competition interacted with a dummy for municipal authorities. 28 A one standard deviation increase in the level of political competition, using the measure defined in BPS (2010), would result if the Democratic vote share were to go down from 57.5 percent (leaning Democratic) to 50 percent (most competitive), or conversely, go up from 42.5 percent (leaning Republican) to 50 percent (most competitive). 29 A one standard deviation increase in per capita income is associated with an increase in benefits of about 6 percent. 30 A one standard deviation increase in the fraction of municipal residents who are homeowners is associated with a decrease 13 benefits. The only variable which shows up as statistically significant and whose sign differs from our a priori expectations is the debt service variable; municipalities where a greater fraction of the tax base goes towards paying interest on the debt have more, rather than less generous pension benefits.
This finding may simply reflect that such municipalities have a higher fiscal capacity but may also reflect the fact that municipalities with generous pensions end up borrowing more.
There are two limitations to the empirical approach presented above. First, we have not accounted for the possibility that the more generous pension benefits may be offset by lower wages and in that case, looking at retirement benefits alone may lead to a misleading and incomplete picture in terms of the effects of political competition. Second, unlike DB plans in the private-sector, employees covered by DB plans in the public-sector contribute to these plans (Munnell, Haverstick, and Soto 2007). Thus, a pension plan could be more generous -in the sense that it pays out more in retirement benefits -but that may simply reflect higher contributions made by the employee during her years of service, rather than the tendency of politicians to pander to voters and make public pensions more generous as has been proposed in this paper. Accordingly, to address both concerns, in our subsequent specifications, I
control for wages and the employee contribution rate to the pension plan. The results obtained using such an approach are presented in Table 3 and form our baseline specifications.
[ Table 3 about here.]
As we observe from the coefficients in columns (1) through (3) of Table 3 , the effects of political competition on the generosity of municipal plans are similar to those reported in Table 2 , albeit somewhat smaller. A one standard deviation increase in the intensity of political competition is associated with an increase in the generosity of pension benefits by about 2.7-3.1 percent (or about $426-507/ retiree/ year), with no effect for plans run by municipal authorities. 31 Contrary to the theory of compensating differentials (but consistent with much of the empirical literature), the coefficient on wages in these benefit regressions is positive and statistically significant across all specifications. Pension benefits are also more generous if employees contribute a greater fraction of their wages into the DB plan with a one percent increase in employee contributions associated with a five percent increase in their benefits. The effects of other control variables are similar to those reported earlier, although the coefficients on collective bargaining coverage averaging 0.22 are about half what we find in Table 2 .
The results from Table 3 can be captured in the form of Figure 2 , which illustrates that political competition has a positive effect on the generosity of municipal plans, but not on plans run by municipal authorities.
[ Figure 2 about here.]
in the generosity of benefits by about 6 percent.
Robustness Checks
In this subsection, I examine the robustness of the finding that political competition is associated with an increase in the generosity of DB municipal plans but not for plans run by municipal authorities.
Alternative measures of generosity of DB plans
The primary measure of the generosity of pension plans we use in our analysis is the average annual benefit per retiree in that plan. The reason I prefer it over other measures, such as the normal cost which measures the present value of benefits accrued in a given year, is because such measures are often systematically and significantly lower than they ought to be. 32 Sabin (2015) in a study of public plans from California reports that the main cause of underfunding in pension plans for the city of Sunnyvale -the municipality he analyzes -was underestimating the normal rate of contribution. As per his analysis, over the 18-year period from fiscal years 1995 to 2012, the normal rate prescribed by CalPERS should have been set 9.0% higher as a percentage of payroll in order to fully fund the plans.
It was the understatement of normal costs, rather than the poor performance of retirement assets, which accounted for about three-quarters of the unfunded liability for Sunnyvale over this period. Table 4 we use the numbers as-is, that is, as reported by the government entities themselves, which implicitly assumes that the projections used by municipalities in coming up with estimates of normal costs are uncorrelated with their underlying levels of political competition. An earlier version of this paper (Bagchi 2016) suggests that this may not be the case; instead, the results in that paper suggest that municipalities that are more competitive also choose higher interest rates and thus politically competitive municipalities systematically underreport their normal costs. The findings of Diebold, Reitano, and McDonald (2018) are in a similar vein; they note that when normal costs increase, "administrators tend to use less prudent methods that defer, or keep low, the pension contributions required from the state while, simultaneously, and perversely, improving the appearance of the plan's funded status and the state's funding discipline."
Attempt to recalculate the normal costs of a pension plan on the basis of a common interest rate follow Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011). On the basis of those steps, I recalculate the normal costs with respect to a discount rate of 7 percent, corresponding to the median across all municipal pension plans in the sample. Panels B, C, and D of Table 4 present the results for three choices of the weighted 32 The normal cost is calculated by apportioning the total present value of an employee's expected benefits in retirement to each year of an employee's worklife, based on a specific actuarial cost method (Public Plans Data, 2001 Data, -2016 . 33 Exhibit 8 of Sabin (2015) shows that for Sunnyvale, investment loss (=$35.3M) + normal loss (= $217.3M) + amortization loss (= $40.8M) = unfunded liability ($293.4M). The normal loss thus accounts for 74.1 percent of the unfunded liability.
average duration of liabilities -11 years, 13 years, and 15 years.
34 Columns (1) through (3) present the coefficient on political competition for municipalities while the coefficient for municipal authorities is presented in columns (4) through (6).
[ Table 4 about here.]
As we can see, the coefficients on political competition continue to be positive and statistically significant in each of the panels for municipal plans. A one standard deviation increase in the intensity of political competition is associated with an increase in the normal costs of about 0.2 percent or 2 percent of the average normal costs. In contrast, there are no effects of political competition on the normal costs for pension plans run by municipal authorities, with the coefficients negative in Panels B through D although they are far from statistical significance.
35
Beyond looking at the average benefits received by a retiree and the normal costs of the plan, another way, plausibly a more direct way, of capturing the degree to which DB plans are back-loaded is to examine the ratio of benefits to wages. Constructing such a ratio is fraught with similar issues we encounter earlier when contemplating the ideal lag structure; the benefit levels pertain to retirees whereas wages pertain to members who are currently active and working and data limitations prevent us from obtaining wages for retirees or benefit levels for those who will be retiring in the future. With that important caveat in mind, we construct two measures -the ratio of benefits to wages and the log of that ratio -and we examine the effects of political competition on these dependent variables in Table 5 .
[ Table 5 about here.]
Based on the coefficients on political competition in Table 5 , we note that political competition is associated with an increase in the ratio of benefits to wages for municipal plans, regardless of whether we express it in absolute or log terms. This is however not true for plans run by municipal authorities.
Alternative ways of measuring political competition
Beyond using the measure of political competition based on Besley, Persson, and Sturm (2010), one can operationalize political competition differently. As Boyne (1994) points out, one ought to take 34 Here is an example: If the normal costs for a plan assuming an 8 percent discount rate are 12 percent (of payroll), the normal costs recalibrated to 7 percent equal 0.12 * (1.08/1.07)^11, or 13.3 percent, if the average duration of liabilities is 11 years. If the average duration of liabilities is longer at 13 years, the normal costs are recalculated as 0.12 * (1.08/1.07)^13 = 13.5 percent. 35 As the 7 percent rate is likely too high, I also discount them back to an interest rate corresponding to the nominal yield on zero-coupon Treasury bonds of similar duration. Based on recent market conditions and expectations of market participants about future economic conditions, I use 1.5 percent for the real yield on long-term zero-coupon Treasury bonds and add in 2 percent to reflect inflation expectations, for a nominal yield of 3.5 percent. I find similar results when calibrating normal costs at a 3.5 percent discount rate. the volatility of party strength into account when constructing a measure of political competition.
Therefore, a potential alternative measure is the standard deviation of Democratic vote share across all elections that occur in any given year. Results with political competition, thus defined, as the independent variable are presented in Panel A of Table 6. [ Table 6 about here.]
As we can see, political competition continues to have a positive and statistically significant effect on the average benefit received per retiree. A one standard deviation increase in the level of political competition, using this measure, leads to an increase in the average retirement benefit of about 3 percent for municipal plans, with no effects for pension plans run by municipal authorities.
The second approach I use in terms of operationalizing political competition differently is to introduce a linear and squared term for the average Democratic vote share in the same specification. Thus the results in Table 6 confirm the positive relationship between political competition and benefit levels for municipal pensions that we observe in Table 3 . They also support the lack of a similar positive relationship between political competition and benefits for plans run by municipal authorities. 36 For example, using the coefficients in col. (3), the level of Democratic vote share at which benefits are maximized = 1.621/(2*1.527) = 53.1 percent. 37 The median value of the variable, average Democratic vote share, goes down from 46.7 percent to 43.9 percent.
Other specification checks
This sub-section includes a number of robustness checks that address concerns of omitted variable bias. As before, columns (1)- (3) of Table 7 present the estimated effect of political competition on plan benefits for municipalities while columns (4)-(6) present the estimates for municipal authorities.
Robustness Check (RC) 1: Controlling for average Democratic vote share In the regressions estimated thus far, I have not included the average vote share for Democrats as a control variable.
Introducing that however may let us separately identify the effect of an increase in Democratic support from an increase in the level of political competition. In this robustness check, I estimate regressions that control for the average Democratic vote share and find that an increase in political competition continues to be associated with an increase in the benefit levels for municipalities with no effect on plans run by municipal authorities. The coefficient on average Democratic vote share, while positive, is not statistically significant at conventional levels of significance in any specification. This raises the possibility of reverse causality between the fiscal health of a municipal plan and the level of political competition in that municipality. Voters are however unlikely to consider the performance of their local officials as they decide who to vote for the office of President. Thus, using vote share based solely on Presidential elections minimizes the possibility of reverse causality associated with using data on elections to all national and state-level offices. 38 Using just such a measure of political competition, I find that the coefficients on political competition are similar to their previous values.
RC2: Using vote shares based solely on Presidential elections
RC3: Including county-specific linear time trends Each of our specifications for which results
were presented thus far have included county (and year) fixed effects, which allow us to control for time-invariant factors at the county level that might affect the generosity of its pension plans. To lend further credibility to our identification strategy, I include a linear time trend for each county thus allowing the level of retirement benefits to evolve separately for each county. Our results for the effects of political competition on pension plan generosity are robust to the inclusion of these trends.
39
RC4: Including county-by-year fixed effects In this robustness check that is particularly demanding of the data, I introduce county-by-year fixed effects that allow for each county to be hit by a 38 Using a 11-year lag structure also reduces the possibility of reverse causality. 39 Results with municipality-specific trends continue to indicate a positive effect of political competition on the generosity of benefits, although the estimated effects are smaller in size.
18 unique shock in each year and find that our results are robust to the inclusion of these county-by-year fixed effects, with the coefficients on political competition somewhat larger in magnitude.
RC5: Long differences In order to examine if long-run shifts in the intensity of political competition have the same effect as those found using data for all years, I estimate regressions using data from only the first (2003) and the last (2013) year of the sample. The positive relationship between the intensity of political competition and benefit levels for municipal plans holds with this approach as well, and the coefficients are roughly similar in magnitude to those in the base specifications. As before, there are no statistically significant effects for pension plans run by municipal authorities.
We can also combine the use of long differences with municipality fixed effects. The thought experiment underlying the use of municipality fixed effects is different from what we have considered thus far; the question being asked in such an estimation is whether an increase in the level of political competition is likely to result in an increase in the generosity of plan benefits for a given municipality.
Given that political competition for a municipality is likely to only change slowly over time, the use of a long differences approach makes sense in such a case. Using municipality fixed effects, the coefficients on political competition are marginally smaller than those estimated in our base specifications and are somewhat less precisely estimated but they too point to a positive relationship between political competition and plan generosity. Of note, the coefficient on log wages at~0.4 (not reported) is less than half what we see earlier, suggesting that unobserved heterogeneity across employers contributes to the observed positive relationship between wages and benefits.
RC6: Only including municipalities that have at least one authority This robustness check
is motivated by the fact that not all municipalities which offer a pension plan also have an authority offering their own pension plan. In particular, municipalities that have a municipal authority offering their own pension plan are larger than the typical municipality offering a pension plan. Hence this robustness check limits the estimation only to pension plans run by municipalities that have at least one municipal authority and pension plans run by municipal authorities. Although this causes our sample size to drop to about 40 percent of the original size, we continue to observe that an increase in political competition is associated with an increase in the generosity of municipal pension plans with no effects on the generosity of pension plans run by municipal authorities.
[ Table 7 about here.]
Overall the results presented in this section in Tables 2 through 7 offer robust evidence that an increase in the level of political competition is associated with an increase in the generosity of municipal pensions with no effects on the generosity of plans run by municipal authorities.
Alternative Lag Structures
Given that the data on pension benefits are not disaggregated by retiree and includes retirees from various cohorts, it is challenging to associate the average level of benefits received by retirees with the level of political competition for one specific year that corresponds to a unique lag structure. Based on Rauh (2017), I have used a lag structure of 11 years in the paper thus far but that is not the only Table 8 (which implicitly assume a rapid process of adjustment) but also try out longer lags of 13 and 15 years in Panels E and F.
[ Table 8 about here.]
As we can see from the results in Table 8 , the estimated effects of political competition are not particularly sensitive to the lag structure used.
Examining the Effects of Political Competition on Defined
Contribution Plans
Anecdotal evidence suggests that political influences are less influential in affecting the parameters for a DC plan compared to a DB plan. 40 For example, a report prepared in the context of reform of
Florida's Retirement System (FRS) (Florida TaxWatch Report 2013) notes:
Another important benefit of the DC Investment Plan is that it is insulated from political temptations....Any benefit given under a DC plan must be paid for in that same year because it cannot be legally underfunded. This improves the financial health and security of the FRS because retirement assets belong to the individual state employees and are therefore not susceptible to the whims of the state.
In Table 9 therefore, I examine the effects of political competition on the employer contribution rate for all DC plans from Pennsylvania for the period 2003-2013. 41 I choose to focus on the employer 40 The decision of whether to offer a DB or a DC plan is, in itself, endogenous. In a set of regressions, using both OLS and probit estimation approaches, I find that an increase in political competition makes it more likely that a municipality offers a DB plan as compared to a DC plan. That result is consistent with the view that politicians in politically competitive jurisdictions desire to pass on the costs of pensions to future generations and the structure of DB (but not DC) plans makes that possible. 41 The effects of political competition on the generosity of DC plans are discussed in Table 8 of Bagchi (2017) as well and so in the interest of transparency, I note the difference between the results in that paper and the ones included here. The differences contribution rate because for DC plans, it is not meaningful to talk of the average pension benefit received on retirement or the ratio of benefits to wages. The employer contribution rate to the DC plan is however a meaningful plan parameter as it reflects the extent to which an employer puts aside money each year and comes closest to our conception of generosity of a DB plan.
I first estimate the effects of political competition on the employer contribution rate using data for all years and for all plans hewing exactly to specification (1) . Subsequent rows replicate the robustness checks that were conducted earlier on DB plans in Table 7 with each row corresponding to a different robustness check. Estimates for municipalities are presented in columns (1) through (3), with estimates for municipal authorities in columns (4) through (6). In the interest of brevity, I only present the coefficients on the variable representing the intensity of political competition and omit coefficients on the control variables. The complete results are available from the author on request.
[ Table 9 about here.]
As the coefficients on political competition indicate, DC plans appear less susceptible to political influence compared to DB plans. The coefficient on political competition for municipal DC plans is statistically insignificant in each of the 24 specifications presented in the table, in contrast to our previous set of findings on DB plans. This null result likely follows from the fact that with DC plans, it is hard for politicians to pass on the costs of a more generous plan onto future generations of taxpayers; a more generous DC plan requires a higher level of contributions today that have to be met from current tax revenues and politicians are less willing to make a DC plan more generous in order to avoid the risk of alienating voters. Unsurprisingly perhaps, political competition has no effect on the employer contribution rate of DC plans run by municipal authorities given that the insulation of authority boards from political influence is now coupled with the transparency of DC plans.
As an additional robustness check, I vary the lag length. 42 While the results above employ the 11-year lag structure that has been used earlier as baseline, in Table 10 I experiment with alternative lags that were used when estimating the effects of political competition for DB plans, viz. 0-3 years in Panels A through D and longer lags of 13 and 15 years in Panels E and F. The results in Table 10 confirm the results from Table 9 ; they suggest that political competition has no effect on the generosity of DC plans, whether run by municipalities or by municipal authorities.
[ Table 10 about here.] primarily pertain to the coverage of the data; first, the dataset used in this paper encompasses a longer period from 2003-2013 (as compared to 2003-2009 in Bagchi 2017) and second, they also include plans run by municipal authorities, whereas the former dataset only included municipal DC plans. The conclusions are however the same using either dataset: in both instances, we see that political competition has no effect on the generosity of DC plans, whether run by municipalities or by municipal authorities. 42 This is also a distinction between the results in this paper and those in Bagchi (2017). The latter only considers the case where there is no lag, i.e. a world in which political competition affects the employer contribution rate contemporaneously.
A sample-split test examining differential effects based on voter awareness
Models of fiscal illusion rely on the existence of informational frictions. If individuals had perfect information about politicians' platforms and were rational, then the political budget cycles modeled by Rogoff (1990) or Rogoff and Sibert (1988) would simply not exist. The model in Glaeser and Ponzetto (2014), which this paper most directly builds on, also hinges on information asymmetries. As noted earlier, the authors argue that pension obligations are shrouded because of lower availability of information about pensions than wages and because voters find it challenging to understand the impact of unfunded pension obligations on their future tax burdens. This insight forms the basis of an empirical test. By splitting the sample of municipalities into two groups based on the level of voter awareness and information, we can examine if the effects of political competition are larger in places that have a higher proportion of uninformed voters. To operationalize this test, I look for variables that likely reflect variations among the residents of a municipality in their ability to understand the nuances of local politics and local public finance.
A literature review suggests that newspapers have been historically the most important source of information about state and local politics and that this has been true even in the television era (Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson 2011). As Hayes and Lawless (2015) note: "When local news outlets like daily newspapers devote less coverage, and less substantive coverage, to politics-whether it be about a House race, state legislative contest, or municipal election-there are few alternative sources to which citizens can turn....In the vast majority of U.S. communities, there is no local Politico, no local Talking Points Memo, no local Hot Air." In stressing the role of local print media, they note that "unlike with national elections, there are virtually no other widely available outlets to which people can turn for information about local politics." Accordingly, based on this review of the literature, I turn to newspaper penetration as a variable which can help us distinguish places that have a large number of well-informed voters from places with relatively few well-informed voters. Using data on newspaper circulation that were generously provided by the Alliance for Audited Media, I am able to obtain estimates of newspaper penetration at the municipal level and I use that variable to split the sample of plans into two groups. 43 The first group includes plans for which their municipality's newspaper penetration is less than (or equal) to the median and a second group that includes plans for which newspaper penetration is higher than the median. In light of our discussion above, I characterize the first group as having a higher proportion of less informed voters and the second group as having a higher proportion of more informed voters. Table 11 presents the results obtained by splitting municipal plans in the manner described above with Panels A, B, and C providing results for log benefits, the unadjusted "as-is" normal costs, and the ratio of benefits to wages respectively. In all panels, columns (1) through (3) present the coefficient on political competition for plans where newspaper penetration is less than or equal to the median whereas Columns (4) through (6) present the coefficient for plans where newspaper penetration is more than the median. The last three columns of the table examine if coefficients in columns (1)- (3) are statistically different from the corresponding coefficients in columns (4)-(6).
[ Table 11 about here.]
The results in Table 11 suggest that the effects of political competition are larger in municipalities where newspaper penetration is less than or equal to the median, whereas they are muted (in fact, absent) in municipalities where newspaper penetration is higher than the median, with the differences in coefficients statistically significant in Panels A and C. Importantly these results do not hinge on places with lower newspaper penetration having more generous plans on average; what these regressions estimate is how plan generosity varies with the level of political competition within each sub-sample.
Given that our findings hold up in the most complete specification in which I control for a variety of municipal characteristics such as per capita income and homeownership rates, one cannot simply explain away these sample-split results as reflecting differences in socioeconomic characteristics between municipalities that have high newspaper penetration from those with relatively low newspaper penetration rates. Furthermore, when I replicate these steps for plans run by municipal authorities, I
observe that across both sub-samples of plans, political competition appears to have no effect on plan generosity reaffirming the view that the differential effects of political competition on municipal plans are being driven by variation in the level of information available to voters rather than by differences in socioeconomic characteristics of the municipalities themselves.
44
Given that newspaper readership is likely to correlate with voter awareness and engagement, the results in this table suggest that when faced with an electorate that is more aware and informed of the true cost of unfunded pension obligations, politicians are less likely to underfund public pensions.
These results are consistent with one of the key assumptions of the model in Glaeser and Ponzetto (2014) as it pertains to limited information on the part of voters and provide an empirical basis for that assumption. The results from Panel A of Table 11 can be captured in the form of Figure 3 , which illustrates that the effects of political competition emerge only in places that have a higher proportion of relatively uninformed voters.
[ Figure 3 about here.] 44 Those additional results for municipal authority sample splits are available from the author on request.
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Conclusions
This paper proposes that political competition plays a key role in influencing the fiscal health of defined benefit pensions offered to public-sector employees. In their desire to win re-election, politicians in politically competitive jurisdictions promise generous benefits to public-sector workers while failing to make the contributions necessary to fund them fully in order to avoid having to raise taxes. Using a difference-in-differences (DID) approach in which DB plans run by municipalities are compared with DB plans run by municipal authorities, I obtain evidence that is consistent with this hypothesis. I find that an increase in political competition is associated with an increase in the generosity of municipal pension plans, with a one standard deviation increase in the level of political competition associated with an increase of about 3 percent in benefits (about $426-507 per retiree per year). These results hold up to controlling for variations across plans in their Social Security coverage and across municipalities in their levels of economic prosperity, age structure, income inequality, and ethnic fragmentation, making it unlikely that heterogeneity across municipalities or plans are driving these results. These results are also robust to a host of checks such as the inclusion of county-specific time trends, countyby-year fixed effects, and the inclusion of municipality fixed effects.
In contrast to the robust effects of political competition on the generosity of municipal DB plans, I fail to discern any relationship between the level of political competition of municipal authorities and the generosity of the plans that they offer. This result is likely driven by the fact that members of municipal authority boards are appointed and hence far removed from the electoral will of voters, at least when compared to mayors and council members who make decisions on municipal pensions.
The starkly different effects of political competition for municipal authorities when compared with municipalities are in line with papers that have examined differences between appointed and elected officials, such as Lim (2013) The desirability of minimizing the influence of electoral politics on the management of public pension plans is buttressed by the null results of political competition on the generosity of defined contribution plans. Indeed, because a more generous DC plan requires higher contributions today rather than several years in the future, the structure of such plans constrains the ability of politicians to pass on the costs of current labor services to future taxpayers. Thus, moving from DB plans to DC plans that we find as less susceptible to political influence may be a useful step that preserves intergenerational equity and reduces the likelihood that future taxpayers will experience tax increases or service cuts to make up for shortfalls in the pension fund. Such motivations appear to have been at work for Utah which ended its traditional DB plan for new workers and offered them a choice between a DC plan and a hybrid DB-DC plan or Rhode Island which created a hybrid DB-DC plan with a lower guaranteed pension supplemented by a DC component (McGuinn 2014) . Similar reforms continue to be debated and discussed across state and local governments throughout the country reflecting the rapidly growing costs they face for public pensions.
Beyond these policy implications, the paper contributes to the literature of public-sector labor markets by highlighting the role played by political competition in generating compensation structures that are backloaded. However, as our sample-split analysis using newspaper penetration data suggests, voter awareness and engagement can moderate the negative effects associated with political competition and local newspapers can play a crucial role in generating such awareness and engagement. The demise of local newspapers which has been noted by many observers (e.g. Schulhofer-Wohl and Garrido 2013) is therefore of concern for those who care about the health of local democracy. 
Variation in Benefit levels with Political Competition for Retirees of Various Plans
All plans included in the estimation in Table 3 were included for this analysis and then split into three equal-sized groups (or "terciles") based on their underlying level of political competition. For each of the four panels, I plot the mean benefit levels for plans that correspond to particular combinations of entity and employee-groups and fall in that tercile. 
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Effects of political competition on generosity of benefits
These plots were drawn using the Stata command, binscatter, with 80 bins used for municipal plans and 40 bins used for municipal authority plans. They correspond to the regression results presented in Columns (3) and (6) of Table 3 in which we regress log average benefit on political competition, controlling for log wages, member contributions to the plan, employee-group dummies, socio-economic controls (the log of per capita income, the fraction of tax revenues spent on debt service, the unemployment rate, the percentage of households that are owner-occupied, the percentage of population aged 65 or older, the level of income inequality, and the level of ethnic fragmentation), along with dummy variables for the class of municipality, and county and year fixed effects. 
30
Effects of political competition on generosity of benefits
These plots were drawn using the Stata command, binscatter, with 70 bins used for both sub-samples of municipal plans. They correspond to the regression results presented in Columns (3) and (6) of Table 11 in which we regress log average benefit on political competition, controlling for log wages, member contributions to the plan, employee-group dummies, socio-economic controls (the log of per capita income, the fraction of tax revenues spent on debt service, the unemployment rate, the percentage of households that are owner-occupied, the percentage of population aged 65 or older, the level of income inequality, and the level of ethnic fragmentation), along with dummy variables for the class of municipality, and county and year fixed effects. Summary statistics for the dependent variables, average benefits per retiree, normal costs, and ratio of benefits to wages are based on biennial data from 2003-2013 provided by the Pennsylvania PERC. Data on Social Security coverage also come from the Pennsylvania PERC. The percentage of employees organized under collective bargaining is for 1982 from the Employment Summary Statistics of Census of Governments. Per capita income, unemployment rate, percentage of households that are owner-occupied, percentage of the population aged 65 or older, income inequality, and ethnic fragmentation are from the Census and the ACS as described in footnote 20. Following Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (2000), income inequality is defined as the ratio of mean household income to median household income and ethnic fragmentation is defined as 10,000 -sum of squares of percentages of the population from each race. Taxes spent on debt servicing is based on annual data from 2003-2013 from the Pennsylvania DCED. All of these variables have been winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels. Lastly, the political variables, average Democratic vote share and measures of political competition are based on all elections to national and state-level offices held in even-numbered years and are constructed using successive issues of the Pennsylvania Manual. The precise election years used depend on the lag structure employed, as described in the text.
32 Table 2 : Effect of Political Competition on Log of Average Benefits using the Absolute Difference of the Democratic Vote Share from 50% as the Measure of Political Competition benefit received by all retirees (including Deferred Retirement Option Plan (DROP) beneficiaries but excluding disability, surviving spousal, and surviving child beneficiaries). The measure of political competition used is that defined by BPS (2010), viz.
P Cmt = −|0.5 − Dmt| and has been lagged by 11 years.
County and year fixed effects, along with employee-group dummies are included in all specifications. Plan-specific controls included in columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) are a dummy variable for Social Security coverage and the fraction of employees organized under collective bargaining. Municipal demographic and fiscal controls included in columns (3) and (6) are the log of per capita income, the fraction of tax revenues spent on debt service, the unemployment rate, the percentage of households that are owner-occupied, the percentage of population aged 65 or older, the level of income inequality, and the level of ethnic fragmentation, along with dummy variables for the class of municipality. The dependent variables and all control variables have been winsorized at the 2.5%
and 97.5% levels.
33 Table 3 benefit received by all retirees (including Deferred Retirement Option Plan (DROP) beneficiaries but excluding disability, surviving spousal, and surviving child beneficiaries). The measure of political competition used is that defined by BPS (2010), viz.
County and year fixed effects, employee-group dummies, log of wages, and employee contributions to the pension plan (as a percent of payroll) are included in all specifications. Plan-specific controls included in columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) are a dummy variable for Social Security coverage and the fraction of employees organized under collective bargaining. Municipal demographic and fiscal controls included in columns (3) and (6) are the log of per capita income, the fraction of tax revenues spent on debt service, the unemployment rate, the percentage of households that are owner-occupied, the percentage of population aged 65 or older, the level of income inequality, and the level of ethnic fragmentation, along with dummy variables for the class of municipality. The dependent variables and all control variables have been winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels. 
(5)
Coefficient for municipal plans (3) and (6) are the log of per capita income, the fraction of tax revenues spent on debt service, the unemployment rate, the percentage of households that are owner-occupied, the percentage of population aged 65 or older, the level of income inequality, and the level of ethnic fragmentation, along with dummy variables for the class of municipality. The dependent variables and all control variables have been winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels. The measure of political competition used is that defined by BPS (2010), viz. P Cmt = −|0.5 − Dmt| and has been lagged by 11 years. County and year fixed effects, employee-group dummies, and employee contributions to the pension plan (as a percent of payroll) are included in all specifications. Plan-specific controls included in columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) are a dummy variable for Social Security coverage and the fraction of employees organized under collective bargaining. Municipal demographic and fiscal controls included in columns (3) and (6) are the log of per capita income, the fraction of tax revenues spent on debt service, the unemployment rate, the percentage of households that are owner-occupied, the percentage of population aged 65 or older, the level of income inequality, and the level of ethnic fragmentation, along with dummy variables for the class of municipality. The dependent variables and all control variables have been winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels. P Cmt = −|0.5 − Dmt|. All measures of political competition have been lagged by 11 years. County and year fixed effects, employee-group dummies, log of wages, and employee contributions to the pension plan (as a percent of payroll) are included in all specifications. Plan-specific controls included in columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) are a dummy variable for Social Security coverage and the fraction of employees organized under collective bargaining. Municipal demographic and fiscal controls included in columns (3) and (6) are the log of per capita income, the fraction of tax revenues spent on debt service, the unemployment rate, the percentage of households that are owner-occupied, the percentage of population aged 65 or older, the level of income inequality, and the level of ethnic fragmentation, along with dummy variables for the class of municipality. The dependent variables and all control variables have been winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels. is the log of the average benefit received by all retirees (including Deferred Retirement Option Plan (DROP) beneficiaries but excluding disability, surviving spousal, and surviving child beneficiaries). The measure of political competition used is that defined by BPS (2010), viz.
P Cmt = −|0.5 − Dmt| and has been lagged by 11 years. County and year fixed effects, employee-group dummies, log of wages, and employee contributions to the pension plan (as a percent of payroll) are included in all specifications, unless otherwise noted. Plan-specific controls included in columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) are a dummy variable for Social Security coverage and the fraction of employees organized under collective bargaining. Municipal demographic and fiscal controls included in columns (3) and (6) are the log of per capita income, the fraction of tax revenues spent on debt service, the unemployment rate, the percentage of households that are owner-occupied, the percentage of population aged 65 or older, the level of income inequality, and the level of ethnic fragmentation, along with dummy variables for the class of municipality. The dependent variables and all control variables have been winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels. 
Coefficient for municipal plans benefit received by all retirees (including Deferred Retirement Option Plan (DROP) beneficiaries but excluding disability, surviving spousal, and surviving child beneficiaries). The measure of political competition used is that defined by BPS (2010), viz.
P Cmt = −|0.5 − Dmt|. County and year fixed effects, employee-group dummies, log of wages, and employee contributions to the pension plan (as a percent of payroll) are included in all specifications. Planspecific controls included in columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) are a dummy variable for Social Security coverage and the fraction of employees organized under collective bargaining. Municipal demographic and fiscal controls included in columns (3) and (6) are the log of per capita income, the fraction of tax revenues spent on debt service, the unemployment rate, the percentage of households that are owner-occupied, the percentage of population aged 65 or older, the level of income inequality, and the level of ethnic fragmentation, along with dummy variables for the class of municipality. The dependent variables and all control variables have been winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels. (3) and (6) are the log of per capita income, the fraction of tax revenues spent on debt service, the unemployment rate, the percentage of households that are owner-occupied, the percentage of population aged 65 or older, the level of income inequality, and the level of ethnic fragmentation, along with dummy variables for the class of municipality. The dependent variables and all control variables have been winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels. rate to the defined contribution plan, expressed as a percentage of payroll. The measure of political competition used is that defined by BPS (2010), viz. P Cmt = −|0.5 − Dmt|. County and year fixed effects and employee-group dummies are included in all specifications. Plan-specific controls included in columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) are a dummy variable for Social Security coverage and the fraction of employees organized under collective bargaining. Municipal demographic and fiscal controls included in columns (3) and (6) are the log of per capita income, the fraction of tax revenues spent on debt service, the unemployment rate, the percentage of households that are owner-occupied, the percentage of population aged 65 or older, the level of income inequality, and the level of ethnic fragmentation, along with dummy variables for the class of municipality. The dependent variables and all control variables have been winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels. 
(6) Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level and are in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The p-value in columns (7) -(9) is generated from statistical tests which examine whether the coefficient on political competition in columns (1) through (3) differs from corresponding coefficients in columns (4) through (6). Regressions estimated on all municipal defined benefit pension plans from Pennsylvania for the period 2003-2013. The dependent variable in Panel A is the log of the average benefit received by all retirees (including Deferred Retirement Option Plan (DROP) beneficiaries but excluding disability, surviving spousal, and surviving child beneficiaries). The dependent variable in Panels B and C are normal costs (as-is) and the ratio of the log of the average benefits received by retirees to the log of wages received by active members. The measure of political competition used is that defined by BPS (2010), viz. P Cmt = −|0.5 − Dmt| and has been lagged by 11 years. The sample splits are based on newspaper penetration constructed using circulation counts provided by the Alliance for Audited Media. These data are at the zipcode level and are based on audits of circulations conducted between June 2010 and June 2012. County and year fixed effects and employee-group dummies are included in all specifications in all panels. Log of wages and employee contributions to the pension plan (as a percent of payroll) are included in Panel A while employee contributions to the pension plan (as a percent of payroll) is included in Panel C. Plan-specific controls included in columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) of all panels are a dummy variable for Social Security coverage and the fraction of employees organized under collective bargaining. Municipal demographic and fiscal controls included in columns (3) and (6) of all panels are the log of per capita income, the fraction of tax revenues spent on debt service, the unemployment rate, the percentage of households that are owner-occupied, the percentage of population aged 65 or older, the level of income inequality, and the level of ethnic fragmentation, along with dummy variables for the class of municipality. The dependent variables and all control variables have been winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels.
Appendix: Using a matching-type estimator to estimate the effects of political competition on the generosity of pension plans I lay out the steps followed in constructing an estimate of the effects of political competition inspired by the literature on matching. 45 In most applications where matching is used we have a binary treatment variable that distinguishes treated and control units. That is different here given that political competition, our key independent variable of interest, is continuous rather than discrete. We can however use a cut-off value of political competition and use that to split the sample of municipal plans into two groups: one with a "low" level of political competition and another with a "high" level of political competition and then examine if benefits are less generous in the first group with a low level of competition.
Where the techniques of matching come in are that rather than comparing these groups as-is, we can construct a matched pair by identifying two plans which look "similar" on their underlying municipal characteristics, and yet differ in their competitiveness such that plan 1 belongs to group 1 with levels of political competition lower than the cut-off and its matched pair belongs to group 2 with levels of political competition higher than the cut-off. More specifically, these are the steps I undertake:
competition between the matched plans in the two groups. Regress the difference in the level of benefits on the difference in the level of political competition, controlling for year and employeegroup fixed effects. Augment the regression progressively with more controls, such as the level of wages in the two municipalities, the member contributions to the plans, and the socio-economic characteristics of the municipalities to which these plans belong.
6. The same set of steps laid out can be replicated for municipal authorities in order to examine the effects of political competition on the generosity of plans run by municipal authorities in this matching-inspired framework. Table A .1 presents the results we obtain following the steps described above. Columns (1) [ Table A .1 about here.]
As we can see, the estimated effects of political competition on municipal plans are positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level (or better) across all specifications. In the unweighted regressions, the coefficients on political competition are clustered in a range from 0.352-0.446, very similar to the range of 0.351-0.417 we report in our baseline results in Table 3 . Considering a one standard deviation change in the independent variable -the difference in the level of political competition between a plan in group 1 and its matched pair in group 2 -the estimated effect of an increase in political competition lies between 2.9-3.7 percent. 46 When we use weighted regressions, the coefficients are larger in magnitude ranging from 0.512-0.598 and the estimated effect of an increase in political competition by one standard deviation averages 4.6 percent.
The identical exercise when conducted for plans run by municipal authorities confirms that political competition does not have any effect on the generosity of such plans. The coefficients are far from statistical significance and in fact, change signs depending on the controls introduced. Thus, on the basis of the results presented in Table A .1, we can be more confident in our conclusions that an increase in political competition is associated with an increase in the generosity of municipal defined benefit plans, but that does not apply to plans run by municipal authorities. received by all retirees (including Deferred Retirement Option Plan (DROP) beneficiaries but excluding disability, surviving spousal, and surviving child beneficiaries). The measure of political competition used is that defined by BPS (2010), viz.
P Cmt = −|0.5 − Dmt| and has been lagged by 11 years. County and year fixed effects, and employee-group dummies are included in all specifications. Columns (2)- (4) and (6)- (8) include the log of wages and member contributions for both plans -those in Group 1 (with "low" political competition) and its matched pair in Group 2 (with "high" political competition). Planspecific controls included in columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) are a dummy variable for Social Security coverage and the fraction of employees organized under collective bargaining for both plans. Municipal demographic and fiscal controls included in columns (4) and (8) are the log of per capita income, the fraction of tax revenues spent on debt service, the unemployment rate, the percentage of households that are owner-occupied, the percentage of population aged 65 or older, the level of income inequality, the level of ethnic fragmentation, and the class of municipality for both municipalities. The dependent variable and all control variables have been winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels.
